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STEWART J. BROWN 
'Echoes of Midlothian5: Scottish 
Liberalism and the South African 
War, 1899-1902 
In 1899, at the beginning of the South African War, the supporters 
of the earl of Rosebery attempted to bring him out of retirement and 
restore him to the leadership of the Liberal party. Their aim was to 
reform the Liberal party, instilling it with enthusiasm for imperialism 
and more efficient government?while dropping 'outworn policies', 
especially Irish home rule. It would be another Midlothian, repeat 
ing the campaign that had brought Gladstone back to the Liberal 
party leadership in 1879-80. The Liberal Imperialist movement and 
the struggle for the Liberal party leadership during the South African 
War have been the subjects of considerable scholarly interest.1 Far 
less attention, however, has been directed to the Scottish context of 
their struggle, despite the fact that both major rivals for the party 
leadership?Rosebery and Campbell-Bannerman?were Scots and 
both looked upon Scotland as their political base.2 Indeed, to a large 
extent the struggle for the Liberal leadership was fought out on 
Scottish soil. This essay will explore that struggle in Scotland, where 
disenchantment among Scottish Liberals with the financial and 
moral costs of imperialism during the war would decide the lead 
ership question, destroying confidence in Liberal Imperialist claims, 
raising doubts about Scotland's role in the British Imperial enterprise 
and preparing the way for a Scottish Liberal revival after 1902 based 
on the old orthodoxy of peace, retrenchment and reform. 
I 
Liberalism was the dominant political creed of Victorian Scotland, 
and the Liberal party, which emerged as a coherent organisation 
i Significant studies include H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: the Ideas 
and Policies of a Post-Gladstonian Elite (Oxford, 1973), esp. 37-124; J. Wilson, CB: A 
Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1973), 299-406; R. Rhodes James, 
Rosebery (London, 1963), 364-458; G. L. Bernstein, 'Sir Henry Campbell-Ban 
nerman and the Liberal Imperialists', fournal of British Studies, xxii (1983), 104-24; 
P. D. Jacobson, 'Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism', ibid., xiii (1973), 83-107. 
2 The Scottish context of the Liberal contest has received some attention in two 
studies: Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 37-124 passim; and I. G. C. Hutchison, A 
Political History of Scotland, 1832-^24 (Edinburgh, 1986), esp. 175-85, 227-40. 
Stewart j. brown is professor of ecclesiastical history at the university of 
Edinburgh. 
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during the later 1860s, established an ascendancy over the Scottish 
electorate and made Scotland a bastion of British Liberalism.1 Scott 
ish voters responded warmly to the Liberal emphasis on individual 
autonomy and self-help, to Liberal doctrines of free trade and limited 
government, to attacks on aristocratic and clerical privilege, and to 
the elevation of free speech and human rationality. In 1876-77, in 
response to the expanded electorate created by the Scottish Reform 
Act of 1868 and to the emergence of the party caucus system in 
England, wealthy Scottish whig-liberals had created two regional 
political organisations in Scotland?one for the East and North of 
Scotland and one for the West and South of Scotland?which in 
1881 merged to form the Scottish Liberal Association. Unlike the 
English National Liberal Federation formed in 1877, the Scottish 
Liberal Association was not intended to be a forum for debating 
policy, but was rather to be limited to providing organisational 
advice and financial assistance to the constituency Liberal associ 
ations. It consisted of a general council, comprised of delegates from 
each of the affiliated constituency associations, and a co-opted execu 
tive council of about twenty members, who represented the men of 
wealth, status and influence within Scottish Liberalism. The general 
council convened each year for an annual meeting, usually in Jan 
uary or February, when membership of the executive was approved 
and the annual report adopted.2 
During its early years, the Scottish Liberal Association was domi 
nated by wealthy whig-liberal landowners and professionals, and 
reflected their interests and concerns.3 While an urban radical, 
Joseph Chamberlain, had been the major influence behind the for 
mation of the English National Liberal Federation, the dominant 
figure behind the Scottish Liberal Association, and its president 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s, was the patrician landowner, the 
earl of Rosebery. He emerged to national prominence in 1879 when 
he stage-managed Gladstone's first Midlothian campaign from his 
Dalmeny estate outside Edinburgh, in what proved for Rosebery a 
successful bid to defeat the representative of the rival duke of Buccle 
uch.4 Rosebery proceeded to develop his own political base in Scot 
land, leading the successful agitation for a separate Scottish Office, 
i I. MacLeod, 'Scotland and the Liberal party, 1880-1900: Church, Ireland 
and Empire' (Glasgow University M. Litt, thesis, 1978), 262. 
2 J. G. Kellas, 'The Liberal Party in Scotland, 1876-1895', ante, xliv (1965), 
2-4; Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 145-6. 
3 For the 'Whig-Liberal' political ethos, see especially the illuminating dis 
cussion in J. P. Parry, Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, i86y 
i8yj (Cambridge, 1986), 42-67. 
4 For an excellent recent study of the first Midlothian campaign, see D. Brooks, 
'Gladstone and Midlothian: the Background of the First Campaign', ante, lxiv 
(1985), 42-67. 
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with a Scottish secretary holding cabinet rank.1 Despite private 
reservations about Irish home rule, he remained loyal to Gladstone 
at the Liberal party crisis of 1885-86. As foreign secretary in the 
Gladstone governments of 1886 and 1892-94, he developed his 
expertise and interests in the area of imperial policy. Following 
Gladstone's retirement in 1894, Rosebery became prime minister 
and Liberal leader. As prime minister, however, he proved erratic 
and over-sensitive. Torn by internal dissension, especially the rivalry 
and personal animus between Rosebery and his chancellor of the 
exchequer, Sir William Harcourt, the Rosebery government of 1894 
95 foundered and the Liberals suffered an overwhelming defeat at 
the general election of 1895.2 The following year, at the age of 
forty-nine, Rosebery resigned as Liberal leader and was replaced by 
Harcourt. 
Rosebery, however, was in the prime of life and he retained a loyal 
following, especially in Scotland, where many shared his enthusiasm 
for imperialism. Rosebery was a great orator, with the ability to 
arouse his audiences to moral fervour for the imperial mission?and 
in late nineteenth-century Scotland, many groups were deriving the 
fruits of empire. In Glasgow, the 'second city of the empire', the 
shipbuilding and heavy engineering industries prospered through 
imperial trade. Scottish banks were heavily involved in overseas 
investment, Scottish engineers supervised the construction of rail 
ways across India and Africa, and Scottish commercial entre 
preneurs, such as Thomas Sutherland, chairman of the P. & O. 
Steam Navigation Company, or William MacKinnon, chairman of 
the Imperial British East India Company, amassed fortunes from the 
empire. The Scottish churches, active in the mission fields, nurtured 
enthusiasts for the 'civilising' mission of Imperialism, of whom David 
Livingstone of Blantyre was the most famous. Scotland sent out some 
of the great aristocratic proconsuls of the Victorian empire, among 
them the earls of Elgin, Aberdeen, Dalhousie and Minto.3 There 
was, in short, an outward-looking Scotland, alive to the economic 
opportunities of empire, and also perceiving itself 
as England's 
imperial partner, part of a mission to bring the gospel, material 
civilization and British conceptions of justice and liberty to the back 
ward regions of the globe. Following his retirement as Liberal leader, 
Rosebery maintained a circle of supporters in the neighbourhood of 
his Dalmeny estate in eastern Scotland. These Roseberyites included 
i H. J. Hanham, 'The Creation of the Scottish Office, 1881?87', furidical Review, 
n.s., x (1968), 207-12. 
2 P. Stansky, Ambitions and Strategies (Oxford, 1964), 158-80; D. A. Hamer, 
Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli (Oxford, 1972), 185-207. 
3 S. and O. Checkland, Industry and Ethos: Scotland i8j2-igi4 (London, 1984), 
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the Scottish Liberal MPs, R. B. Haldane, Ronald Munro-Ferguson, 
and Thomas D. Gibson-CarmichaeL the Edinburgh University phil 
osophy lecturer, Dr Charles M. Douglas, and two English MPs 
with strong Scottish connections, H. H. Asquith and Edward Grey. 
Members of the traditional whig-liberal governing elite in Scot 
land?landed gentlemen, legal professionals and academics?these 
men had little taste for the emerging democracy. They were confident 
of their capacity to transcend interest politics and class conflicts 
and, in the words of the historian of the movement, cto bring an 
independent and untrammelled judgement to bear upon the national 
problems of the day'. As Gibson-Carmichael's wife later recalled, 
Rosebery's circle 'foregathered and discussed State affairs in good 
old eighteenth-century style, sitting round the mahogany, under 
family pictures, with ... [a] choice vintage to provide good cheer 
and an alternative topic of conversation'.1 They also controlled the 
executive of the Scottish Liberal Association. Rosebery retained the 
presidency of the association, while the two vice-presidents were 
also supporters. His protege and former private secretary, Munro 
Ferguson, was both treasurer of the association and Scottish Liberal 
whip, and Gibson-Carmichael, MP for the Rosebery-controlled 
county of Midlothian, was chairman of the general council.2 
Rosebery and his supporters believed they would find support in 
Scotland for a new Liberal creed?'Liberal Imperialism'?embrac 
ing not only an enthusiasm for empire, but also proposals for a more 
efficient, business-like approach to government and an increased role 
for the state in education, scientific research and social reform.3 In 
the west of Scotland, Glasgow was a model progressive municipal 
corporation, with advanced transport, gas, water and sanitary ser 
vices that exemplified the ideal of'efficiency'?while Glasgow's close 
economic ties with Belfast meant that many in the business com 
munity had repudiated Irish home rule. Although still largely view 
ing themselves as Liberals, Glaswegian voters had rejected Glad 
stonian Liberalism after 1886, and the west of Scotland had become 
one of the centres of Liberal Unionist strength in Britain.4 If the 
party would drop Irish home rule, several Liberal Unionist MPs 
expressed themselves prepared to return to the Liberal fold.5 In the 
north and east of Scotland, the traditional landed and professional 
elites could be expected to respond to appeals for a sane imperialism 
i Lord Carmichael of Stirling: A Memoir Prepared by his Wife (London, n.d.), 90-1. 
2 Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 177. 
3 For further discussion of the ideas of Liberal Imperialism, see especially G. R. 
Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 
i8gg-igi4 (Oxford, 1971), and Mathew, Liberal Imperialists. 
4 M. Fry, Patronage and Principle. A Political History of Modern Scotland (Aberdeen, 
1987), 111-2; MacLeod, 'Scotland and the Liberal Party', 112, 126. 
5 Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 176. 
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and more 'efficient' government. The presbyterian dissenting chur 
ches?the Free Church and the United Presbyterians?had by 1895 
largely dropped their campaign to disestablish the Church of 
Scotland, and were instead working for presbyterian reunion, to 
make the churches more efficient in their home and overseas 
missions.1 Liberal Imperialists also believed that their attention to 
social reform would win back working class voters. In October 1896, 
Munro-Ferguson informed Rosebery that only 'middle class faddists 
or enthusiasts' stood against his return as Liberal leader, and in 
August 1897 R. B. Haldane assured Rosebery that he would again 
be leader in 'about five years'?after the ground had been 'cleared 
of the rubbish which now covers it'.2 
In order to reform the Scottish Liberal party, the Liberal Imperi 
alists would need either to convert or silence the party's largely 
middle-class and artisan radical or Gladstonian wing, which 
remained committed to the old Liberal orthodoxy of peace, retrench 
ment and popular reform, and which had no enthusiasm for imperi 
alism or 
'efficiency'.3 Radicals were deeply opposed to privilege, 
whether of birth or wealth, and proud of Scotland's 'democratic' 
traditions in education and religion. Most were intensely indi 
vidualistic, with a distrust of state centralism and collectivism. They 
resented what they perceived as Scotland's subordinate and peri 
pheral position in British politics, and responded warmly to Glad 
stone's appeals to moral imperatives and the rights of small nations 
in international politics. The radical wing in Scottish Liberalism had 
been strengthened by the expansion of the electorate in 1884, by the 
defection of the Liberal Unionists in 1885-6, and by the 'crofters' 
war5 in the Highlands. Radicals called for the disestablishment of 
the Church of Scotland and full religious equality. In response to the 
Irish movement, Scottish radicals embraced the cause of Scottish 
home rule and in 1886 formed the Scottish Home Rule Association, 
calling for 'home-rule-all-round' and a radical restructuring of the 
British state.4 Although they rejected collectivism, they supported 
the efforts of Scottish labour for improved conditions and greater 
dignity for the working man. In 1888, several radicals, including Dr 
Gavin B. Clark and R. B. Cunninghame-Graham, joined James Keir 
Hardie in forming the Scottish Labour Party. 
In the later 1880s, the radical wing, under the leadership of the 
i G. I. T. Machin, 'Voluntaryism and Reunion', in Church, Politics and Society: 
Scotland 1408-1 g2g, ed. N. MacDougall (Edinburgh, 1983), 228-33. 
2 R. Munro-Ferguson to Rosebery, 19 Oct. 1896, cited in Hutchison, Political 
History of Scotland, 177; National Library of Scotland [NLS,], Rosebery MSS, MS 
10029, f?s 57~6?> R. B. Haldane to Rosebery, 24 Aug. 1897. 
3 In my discussion of the radical wing of Scottish Liberalism, I 
am 
again 
indebted to Parry, Democracy and Religion, 199-257. 
4 H. J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (London, 1969), 91-4. 
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Gladstonians, A. L. Brown of Galashiels and David McLardy of 
Glasgow, came to dominate the general council of the Scottish Lib 
eral Association. There was a minor revolution in the association in 
1886, when, responding to the Liberal crisis following the secession 
of the Liberal Unionists, the executive agreed to permit the discussion 
of party policy in the general council. In the early 1880s, the associ 
ation had begun holding autumn conferences of the general council 
in different towns and cities around Scotland, and after 1886 these 
autumn conferences became popular forums for policy discussions 
and the adoption of lengthy programmes of reform proposals. In 
October 1891, for example, the general council passed resolutions 
calling for Scottish and Irish home rule, disestablishment, women's 
suffrage, the eight-hour day, payment of MPs, triennial parliaments, 
the taxation of land values, and the abolition of the house of lords.1 
Theirs was, Scottish radicals believed, more advanced than the cele 
brated Newcastle Programme adopted by the National Liberal Fed 
eration in England that same month. 'The programme passed at 
Newcastle', David McLardy asserted at the council's annual meeting 
in February 1892, 'might be good enough for Englishmen, but it was 
not good enough for Scotsmen?it wanted the democratic ring'.2 
The radical wing was strengthened in 1896, when Harcourt became 
leader of the Liberal party, cooperating closely with John Morley, 
MP for Montrose Burghs, who had a strong following in northeast 
Scotland. 
In the 1880s and early 1890s, some Scottish radicals had looked 
to Rosebery as Gladstone's heir as Liberal leader, a Scottish patriot 
who had led the fight for the creation of the Scottish Office, an 
aristocrat with concern for the common man, an orator who could 
appeal to all classes with emotional addresses on Scotland's history 
and culture. Tt is because we think you are a Radical like ourselves', 
the left-wing leader, A. L. Brown, wrote to Rosebery in March 1894, 
'ready and willing to lead us along the only safe path now, that we 
are 
willing to give you our absolute confidence'.3 T really don't think 
you realise', Brown assured him in October 1896, 'how very earnestly 
some of us desire to be led by one who can really speak as a Scotsman 
to Scotsmen'.4 Rosebery, however, was determined to curb the rad 
ical influence in the Scottish Liberal Association. Although con 
cerned for the improvement of social conditions (as illustrated in his 
i Edinburgh University Library, Special Collection, [EUL], Scottish Liberal 
Association Minutes [SLA Mins.], Western General Council Conference, Glasgow, 
7 Oct. 1891. 
2 Kellas, 'Liberal Party in Scotland', 14. 
3 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10092, fos. 26-36, A. L. Brown to Rosebery, 4 Mar. 
1894. 
4 Ibid., MS 10108, fos 144-5, Brown to Rosebery, 8 Oct. 1896. 
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l62 STEWART J. BROWN 
progressive chairmanship of the London County Council during the 
early 1890s), he believed that lasting improvement would come 
through disinterested leadership by an educated elite with freedom 
to make independent judgments, and not through radical policy 
programmes.1 He also believed that social progress in Scotland was 
inextricably tied to the development of the British empire. Late in 
1898, Rosebery created a crisis in the Scottish Liberal Association 
when he tendered his resignation as president in protest against the 
'faddist' policy resolutions being adopted by the general council. 
Other Liberal Imperialists were prepared to follow him out, which 
would have resulted in the disruption of the Association and another 
major split in Scottish Liberalism. The radicals now backed down, 
allowing the Liberal Imperialists to gain full control of the executive. 
In December, the executive promised Rosebery that if he would 
withdraw his resignation, it would curb policy discussions in the 
general council?both by ceasing to introduce executive-sponsored 
policy resolutions at council meetings and by limiting the intro 
duction of policy resolutions from constituency associations. Rose 
bery accordingly withdrew his resignation. 'We are pretty right here 
in Scotland', observed Munro-Ferguson in January 1899, 'Our fight 
in the Executive is fought out'.2 The usual autumn conference of the 
general council was not even scheduled for 1899. 
In late 1898, in the aftermath of the Fashoda crisis, a concerted 
Liberal Imperialist attack on Harcourt resulted in his resignation as 
Liberal leader. Harcourt was replaced as leader by a Scot, Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, who had been a loyal secretary of state for 
war in Rosebery's government and was acceptable to the Liberal 
Imperialists, who believed he would prove sound on the empire.3 
MP for Stirling Burghs, Campbell-Bannerman maintained a Scottish 
country home, Belmont Castle, and had his own circle of Scottish 
political supporters, including the Gladstonians, Thomas Shaw, W. 
Lang Todd, and John Sinclair.4 A plodding speaker, he was generally 
regarded as a man of limited abilities and a mere stop-gap leader. 
The Liberal Imperialists soon became impatient with his uninspiring 
leadership in the commons, but Rosebery endeavoured to silence 
their criticism. As he cautioned Munro-Ferguson in March 1899, 
i Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 226-7. 
2 EUL, SLA Mins., Executive Council, 20 Oct., 8 Nov., 1898, 13 Jan. 1899; 
British Library [BL], Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41222, fos 278-83, 
284-6, 291-4, R. Munro-Ferguson to H. Campbell-Bannerman, 19 Nov., 
16 Dec. 
1898, 23 Jan. 1899; NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10111, fos 113-4, 118-20, 139 
40, T. D. Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery, 15 Oct. 1898, Rosebery to Gibson 
Carmichael, 19 Oct. 1898, Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery, 21 Nov. 1898. 
3 Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 31-2. 
4 Wilson, CB, 147-57. 
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'remember that he is thoroughly straight, a gentleman, a friend of 
yours, a Scot, and do not be hasty to despair of him'.1 
II 
News of war between Britain and the Boer republics of the Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State reached Scotland in mid-October 1899. 
There was considerable public excitement as Scotland's historic regi 
ments were called up. In Glasgow and the industrial west, the war 
brought lucrative military contracts, jobs and higher wages. The 
Scottish presbyterian churches, on the whole, supported the war, 
with the respected South African missionary and moderator of the 
Free Church general assembly of 1899, James Stewart of Lovedale, 
condemning the Boers not only for oppressing white uitlanders, but 
also for obstructing the Christian mission to black South Africans.2 
The fact that the Boers had begun the war by invading British 
territory settled the issue for many who had previously opposed 
Chamberlain's foreign policy. Close economic ties with South Africa, 
especially in the mining industry, meant that some Scots had personal 
reasons for disliking the Boers. T did not know until I had spoken to 
my constituents', Haldane observed of his East Lothian seat in mid 
October, '... what a strong deep feeling there was?not jingoism but 
the sense of wrong done them in the person of some brother or 
nephew or son who had been ill-used in the Transvaal'.3 According 
to J. W. Crombie, Liberal MP for Kincardine, 'the general opinion 
of Liberals is this: "War is a bad business but the Boers have brought 
it on themselves and it can't be helped" '.4 
While Scottish opinion seemed to rally behind the British forces, 
however, a number of Gladstonians and radicals believed the war to 
be the inevitable result of aggressive imperialist policies directed 
against the small republics. Among the Scottish Liberal MPs, the 
leading 'pro-Boer' was John Morley, who both challenged the moral 
ity of the war and warned of the high costs of imperialism?costs 
which would force an increase in taxation and divert resources from 
needed social reforms at home.5 Another prominent Scottish 'pro 
i Rhodes James, Rosebery, 420. 
2 Scotsman, 6 Oct. 1899; Glasgow Herald, 23 Jan. 1900. 
3 R. B. Haldane to J. A. Spender, 14 Oct. 1899, cited in D. C. Elliot, 'The 
Liberal Party in Scotland from the Midlothian Election to the First World War' 
(Harvard University Ph.D. thesis, 1950), 75. 
4 J. A. Crombie to J. Bryce, 7 Oct. 1899, cited in MacLeod, 'Scotland and the 
Liberal Party', 234. 
5 For Morley's views on the war, see D. A. Hamer, John Morley. Liberal Intellectual 
in Politics (Oxford, 1968), 311-28. 
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Boer5 was Dr. G. B. Clark, the 'crofters' MP' for Caithness-shire, a 
founding member of the Scottish Labour Party and a former presi 
dent of the Scottish Home Rule Association?who had also served 
for a time as a consul-general for the Boer republics in London.1 On 
19 October 1899, no fewer than 17 of the 41 Liberal MPs for Scotland 
voted for Philip Stanhope's amendment in the commons 'dis 
approving of the conduct of the negotiations which had involved us 
in hostilities with the South African Republics'.2 
Rosebery and the Liberal Imperialists were largely uninformed 
on the situation in South Africa, while Rosebery himself had little 
confidence in either Chamberlain or Arthur Milner, the chief archi 
tects of British imperial policy in the region.3 However, once the war 
had begun the Liberal Imperialists defended it as a just and necessary 
struggle for the rights of British subjects in the Transvaal and the 
preservation of the British empire. Privately, they also viewed the 
war as an opportunity for rallying the nation behind the imperial 
mission and restoring a 'sane' Liberalism at home. With their pro 
Boer sentiments, the Gladstonian radicals appeared to be cutting 
themselves off from popular opinion. The war, then, might provide 
the occasion for purging the Liberal party of the radical element, 
and reconstructing it along Liberal Imperialist lines. The Liberal 
party, Rosebery assured Edward Grey on 21 October 1899, 'is near 
ing its final cataclysm. The rump will break with the Imperialist 
section and ally itself with the Irishry. All this in the long run must 
tend to the good'.4 In October, Rosebery became an 'independent 
Liberal' candidate for the rectorship of Glasgow University, in the 
pro-imperialist industrial west, and Haldane and Grey travelled to 
Glasgow to campaign for him.5 When Rosebery was elected, defeat 
ing the Liberal Unionist candidate and celebrated physicist, Lord 
Kelvin, his supporters grew convinced that Scottish Liberalism was 
rallying to their standard. Although there was 'a good large section 
against us', Munro-Ferguson reported to Rosebery on 30 October, 
T am sure we have the majority of the party'. Rosebery now seemed 
prepared to come out of retirement. 'The position of the Liberal 
party', he wrote Haldane on 4 November, 'is very difficult just 
now... . But I think the Liberal Imperialists should unfurl their flag. 
i Other leading Scottish pro-Boer MPs included Thomas Shaw (Hawick 
Burghs), D. V. Pirie (Aberdeen North), James Bryce (Aberdeen South) and R. T. 
Reid (Dumfries Burghs). 
2 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 4th ser., lxxvii (1899), cols. 367-72. 
3 Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 172-3. 
4 Rhodes James, Rosebery, 412-3. 
5 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10131, fo 208, Rosebery to E. Grey, 21 Oct. 1899; 
MS 10028, fos 85-6, Grey to Rosebery, 22 Oct. 1899; Scotsman, 26 Oct. 1899. 
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The name alone will purge the Liberal party of the ranker elements 
which have done it so much harm'.1 
Campbell-Bannerman, meanwhile, was seeking to conciliate both 
wings of the party, publicly criticising the Unionist government's 
South African policy as aggressive and expansionist, but acknowl 
edging that the war would have to be seen through to victory.2 The 
Liberal Imperialists were unhappy with the party leader's lack of 
zeal for the war, but avoided open confrontation. Early in November, 
the Liberal Imperialist Scottish whip, Munro-Ferguson, informed 
Campbell-Bannerman that as the party in Scotland was 'much divi 
ded', he was advising Liberal candidates 'not to rush their meetings 
for awhile'. It was fortunate, he added, that the 'propaganda work' of 
Scottish Liberal Association had been stopped.3 Although Campbell 
Bannerman admitted there was 'a good deal of war fever' in Scotland, 
he refused to countenance any muzzling of the party.4 Rather, he 
decided to carry his own standard into Scotland, agreeing to address 
a public meeting in Aberdeen on 19 December 1899 to demonstrate 
support for the city's two pro-Boer Liberal MPs, D. V. Pirie and 
James Bryce. Further, he asked the executive of the Scottish Liberal 
Association to call an autumn conference of the general council for 
the day after his address. The executive was thrown into confusion 
by this request. No autumn general council conference had been 
planned that year; indeed, after the agreement of 1898 the Liberal 
Imperialists controlling the executive believed they had finished 
with the general council conferences. Despite their misgivings the 
executive agreed not to refuse Campbell-Bannerman's request?but 
Rosebery, Munro-Ferguson, Grey and Haldane declined to attend 
the 
meeting.5 
On 19 December 1899, Campbell-Bannerman addressed the pub 
lic meeting in Aberdeen?before an audience stunned by the British 
reverses of the 'Black Week' of 10-17 December, including the 
slaughter of the Highland Brigade and the death of the popular 
General 
'Andy' Wauchope at Magersfontein.6 While lauding the 
qualities of the British soldiers, Campbell-Bannerman openly con 
demned the imperialist policies that he argued had led to an 
i NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10019, fos 125-6, R. Munro-Ferguson to Rosebery, 
30 Oct. 1899; NLS, Haldane MSS, MS 5904, fos 208-9, Rosebery to R. B. Haldane, 
4 Nov. 1899. 
2 Wilson, CB, 315-6. 
3 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41222, fos 307-10, R. Munro 
Ferguson to H. Campbell-Bannerman, 8 Nov. 1899. 
4 Campbell-Bannerman to H. Gladstone, 7 Dec. 1899, cited in Wilson, CB, 
320. 
5 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10112, fos 226-7, T. D. Gibson-Carmichael to 
Rosebery, 25 Nov. 1899; Scotsman, 20 Dec. 1899. 
6 General Wauchope had run against W. E. Gladstone for Midlothian in the 
general election of 1895. 
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unnecessary war. 'The Liberal party', he proclaimed, 'accepts no 
responsibility for this war?and has never acquiesced in the policy 
and proceedings which had led to it'.1 At the general council con 
ference the next day, the executive appeared to register formal dis 
approval of Campbell-Bannerman when it refused to move the cus 
tomary executive-sponsored resolution of confidence in the party 
leader. This rebuff brought an angry response from the conference 
floor. The radicals, A. L. Brown, David McLardy and G. B. Waddell, 
publicly deplored the executive's slighting of the party leader, and 
suggested that the executive was acting on Rosebery's instructions. 
The general council then broke with the executive and adopted an 
'unofficial' resolution of its 'continued and unabated confidence' in 
Campbell-Bannerman's leadership. The council also disavowed the 
arrangement over policy resolutions made the previous year between 
the executive and Rosebery, and it proceeded to endorse a full 
programme of policy resolutions, including home-rule-all-round, dis 
establishment, women's suffrage, taxation of land values, and the 
abolition of the house of lords.2 'It was', the Unionist Scotsman 
reported on 21 December, 'neither a happy nor a harmonious party 
that assembled at Aberdeen': 
'signs of disagreement' were 'obtru 
sive'.3 None the less, Campbell-Bannerman believed that 'the whole 
thing at the meeting went off well'.4 He had reason to feel encour 
aged. He had revived the general council of the Scottish Liberal 
Association as a forum for policy discussion, while the Liberal press 
in Scotland was broadly supportive of the line he had taken in his 
speech.5 His position, moreover, was acceptable to the anti-war 
Liberals and gained him the support of the Harcourt-Morley group 
in Scotland?eliminating for the time being any threat from the left 
wing of the party while he consolidated his hold on the centre. 
For Rosebery, the Aberdeen conference had been humiliating. He 
was hurt and angered by the accusation that he had instructed the 
executive to slight the party leader?an accusation that the general 
council had seemed to endorse. On 23 December, he felt obliged to 
write to Campbell-Bannerman to expose the 'perversion of the facts' 
expressed by the radicals in the council. He had, he admitted, 
opposed the idea of an executive-sponsored resolution of confidence 
in the leader, but only because he saw it as a precedent, 'the thin 
end of the wedge for reverting to the former practice [of policy 
i Scotsman, 20 Dec. 1899. 
2 EUL, SLA Mins., General Council, 20 Dec. 1899; North British Daily Mail, 
21 Dec. 1899. 
3 Scotsman, 21 Dec. 1899. 
4 NLS, Haldane MSS, MS 5904, fos. 216-7, H. Campbell-Bannerman to Hal 
dane, 21 Dec. 1899. 
5 See, for example, Dundee Advertiser, North British Daily Mail, both 20 Dec. 1899. 
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.188 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 05:31:47 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SCOTTISH LIBERALISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 167 
resolutions]'.1 This explanation could have done little to placate 
Campbell-Bannerman, who now suspected a desire for 'open revolt' 
among the Liberal Imperialists.2 On Haldane's recommendation, 
Rosebery now decided to cut his ties to the Scottish Liberal Associ 
ation (of which he was one of the founders) and on 26 January 1900, 
a month after the Aberdeen meeting, he resigned as president of the 
association, explaining that he was now a 'non-party politician'.3 
This time there was no effort to convince him to remain, and at 
the annual meeting of the association on 27 February, Campbell 
Bannerman was elected president. Campbell-Bannerman's main 
concern remained to preserve party unity. He made no move to 
remove the other Liberal Imperialists from the executive, even 
though he suspected they were remaining only in order to 'pull the 
strings' for Rosebery.4 At the February meeting, moderates con 
vinced A. L. Brown to withdraw an anti-war motion that might have 
forced the succession of the remaining Liberal Imperialists from 
the association. 'The responsible feeling', an observer reported to 
Rosebery on 29 February, 'was towards avoiding a split'.5 
In breaking their ties with the Scottish Liberal Association, the 
Roseberyites had reason to believe that they were doing no harm to 
their position among rank and file Scottish Liberals. For while the 
general council of the association was largely critical of the war, 
outside the association the Scottish people as a whole appeared 
committed to imperial victory in South Africa. 'Lord Rosebery's 
outspoken patriotism', a Scottish correspondent reported in The 
Times on 30 December 1899, nas l?st hin* none of his popularity in 
Scotland. As a matter of fact the tide of feeling in this country runs 
very strongly in favour of the war'. T hear on all sides', Haldane 
assured Rosebery on 29 December, 'that there are, north of the 
Tweed, all the indications of a growing body of Liberalism which 
the officiai organisations wholly fail to represent. It is the old story 
of the difference between religion and dogma'.6 The Scottish Liberal 
Association might continue to represent the old Gladstonian 'dog 
mas' of peace, retrenchment and reform. But for Liberal Imperialists, 
i BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41226, fo 250, Rosebery to 
Campbell-Bannerman, 23 Dec. 1899; NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10131, fos 216-7, 
Rosebery to T. D. Gibson-Carmichael, 25 Dec. 1899. 
2 Wilson, CB, 318-20. 
3 EUL, SLA Mins., Executive Council, 26 Jan. 1900; Mathew, Liberal Imperi 
alists, 47. 
4 BL, Viscount Gladstone MSS, Add. MS 45987, fo 78, Campbell-Bannerman 
to H. Gladstone, 21 Jan. 1900. 
5 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10113, fos 89-92^. S. Haldane (R. B. Haldane's 
brother) to Rosebery, 29 Feb. 1900. 
6 The Times, 30 Dec. 1899; NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10029, f?s 95~6> R. B. 
Haldane to Rosebery, 29 Feb. 1900. 
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the 
'religion' of Liberalism was capable of development, and they 
believed Scottish Liberals were embracing the imperialist mission. 
Ill 
The Liberal divisions in Scotland over the war were further defined in 
the spring of 1900, when a series of anti-war meetings were violently 
broken up by jingo mobs in some of Britain's worst war-related 
rioting. The meetings were connected with the visit of the South 
African anti-war activist, S. C. Cronwright-Schreiner, whose speak 
ing tour was sponsored jointly by the Stop-the-War Committee and 
the Independent Labour Party [I.L.P.]. The tour began on 6 March 
with a public meeting in Glasgow. Along with Cronwright-Schreiner, 
speakers included the Scottish Labour leader, James Keir Hardie, 
and the Liberal pro-Boer MPs, David Lloyd George and Henry J. 
Wilson, while local representatives of the Liberal party, the I.L.P. 
and the Irish National League appeared on the platform. Order was 
maintained inside the meeting hall by I.L.P. stewards. Outside, 
however, a large jingo crowd, including many Glasgow University 
students, paraded through the streets and ransacked the offices of 
the pro-Boer I.L.P. Labour Leader.1 Keir Hardie was convinced that 
the attack had been organised.2 
The following night in Edinburgh, a jingo mob led by Edinburgh 
University students was well prepared to disrupt the anti-war 
meeting. The mob prevented Cronwright-Schreiner from entering 
the building, while inside the hall, young jingoes drowned out Keir 
Hardie's attempts to open the meeting, then stormed the platform 
armed with clubs. The elderly Theodore Napier, a well-known Scott 
ish home ruler and chairman of the Edinburgh Stop-the-War Com 
mittee, was singled out and beaten up. Rioting spread to the streets 
and continued long into the night. The lack of protection for the 
meeting suggested that the police colluded with the imperialist m?b.3 
More violence occurred the next night at Dundee, where university 
students led a mob which broke up the Cronwright-Schreiner meet 
ing in the Gilfillan Memorial Church, rioted through the streets, 
then returned to damage the minister's manse.4 After the Dundee 
riot, the rest of the tour was cancelled and Cronwright-Schreiner left 
i S. G. Cronwright-Schreiner, The Land of Free Speech: Record of a Campaign on 
Behalf of Peace in England and Scotland in igoo (London, 1906), 63-76; Glasgow Herald, 
7 Mar. 1900. 
2 Edinburgh Evening News, 9 Mar. 1900. 
3 Cronwright-Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, 77-119; Scotsman, 8 Mar,. 1900. 
4 Cronwright-Schreiner, Land of Free Speech, 120-33; W. M. Walker, futeopolis 
(Edinburgh, 1979), 277-8; Glasgow Herald, 9 Mar. 1900. For the role of the students, 
see R. Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class (London, 1972), 150-2. 
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Scotland. Leading Scottish Unionist newspapers excused and even 
encouraged the attacks. The Glasgow Herald characterised the peace 
meetings as 'the issue of a diseased brain', while the Scotsman expressed 
its 
'contempt5 for opponents of the war and hoped that the violence 
by the 'high-spirited young people5 would drive the pro-Boers back 
into 'holes and corners and behind closed doors5.1 
Others in Scotland, however, were disturbed by a patriotism that 
refused the right of free speech to dissenting minorities. For the 
Liberal Dundee Advertiser, which supported the war, the 'dem 
onstrations of intolerance5 were both shameful in themselves and 
serious threats to basic liberal values. 'There is5, it observed, 'no such 
thing as free speech at this moment5. The Liberal, pro-Boer Edinburgh 
Evening News referred to 'the fierce epidemic of Yahooism5 and 'dis 
graceful conduct of the mob5?while it also condemned the 'Jingo 
press of Edinburgh5 with 'its veiled approval of conduct of which a 
band of lunatics would be ashamed5. On 13 March, the Edinburgh 
Trades Council held a special meeting to condemn the break-up of 
the anti-war meeting, while protests at the inaction of the police were 
raised in the Edinburgh city council. Few Scottish Liberals were 
jingos, and the jingo attacks seemed to be raising doubts about 
imperial policy among Scottish Liberals who had supported the war 
as just and necessary. By mid April even the Liberal Imperialist 
Munro-Ferguson, as Scottish Liberal whip, was denouncing attacks 
on anti-war 
meetings.2 
By the late spring of 1900, the arrival of large numbers of imperial 
troops had turned the tide after the humiliating early set-backs and 
the war seemed to be coming to a victorious conclusion. On 18 May, 
following the relief of Mafeking, Scottish towns and cities joined in 
the raucous victory celebrations, which continued until the British 
occupation of the Transvaal capital of Pretoria in early June. For 
the Liberal Imperialists, the carnival mood was a further dem 
onstration of national commitment to the empire. 'We are all Imperi 
alists now5, Rosebery assured the fifth annual meeting of the Edin 
burgh Unity of the Empire Association in April 1900.3 Surely the 
time had come for Scottish Liberalism to renounce the Gladstonian 
reserve toward the empire. 'The old Liberalism5, the Unionist Glas 
gow Herald asserted on 12 April, 'is completely discredited; it has been 
tested by the touchstone of war and found wanting. It is now possible 
that a new and more honest Liberal party will yet spring from the fire 
in which is consumed the cant of the old5. The present 'remarkable 
moment5, Rosebery observed in a letter published in the Glasgow 
i Glasgow Herald, 7, 14 Mar. 1900; Scotsman, 8 Mar. 1900. 
2 Dundee Advertiser, 13 Apr. 1900. 
3 Glasgow Herald, 5 Apr. 1900. 
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Herald on 2 June, 'finds faction annihilated by a war in which the 
great mass of the nation desires to stand shoulder to shoulder. For 
war, with all its curses, may ultimately bring a blessing'.1 
Early in June, Campbell-Bannerman sought to reassert his lead 
ership in the Scottish party with a public address sponsored by 
the Glasgow Liberal Council. The Liberal party, he claimed, had 
remained largely quiet while the war was being fought, so as not to 
jeopardize the British forces in the field. But now, with the war 
apparently won, it was time for the opposition to rouse itself. He 
proceeded to denounce the imperialist policies that had led to the 
war, and to call for a generous peace settlement that would start 
with the annexation of the Boer states but also include the eventual 
granting of self-governing dominion status.2 Amid the national cele 
brations of victory, Campbell-Bannerman's address, delivered to a 
partially filled hall, was not a success, and his Liberal leadership 
seemed in question.3 Rosebery, meanwhile, was being pressed by the 
Scottish Liberal right to reclaim the party leadership. 'The call is 
first to Lord Rosebery', asserted the Glasgow North British Daily Mail 
on 8 June, 'and the party waits for him'.4 However, with a general 
election expected in the autumn, he decided to wait. The party, he 
confided to a Scottish supporter, seemed to recognise that it was on 
'the brink of a catastrophe' and sought a new leader before the 
election. But he had no desire to bear upon himself the blame for 
another electoral defeat, to become a 'scape goat, who shall bear the 
sins of the people, the burden of past blunders'. He had bitter mem 
ories of insomnia, ill-health and feelings of betrayal from his months 
as Liberal leader. 'Politics may possibly come to me', he wrote, 'but 
I shall not go to them'. He would, in short, wait until after the election 
for a clear call from the Liberal party. Thus, while a dispirited Liberal 
party waited for the election, remarked the Glasgow Herald on 13 
June, Rosebery '[like Achilles] dreams lazily in his tent'.5 
In the autumn of 1900, the Unionist government called a general 
election. The Scottish Liberal party entered the election divided, 
defensive and largely leaderless. The election resulted in another 
Liberal defeat. The number of Liberal seats in Scotland had already 
been greatly reduced at the election of 1895. Now, with the general 
election of 1900, the Liberals lost their majority of Scottish par 
liamentary seats for the first time since the Reform Act of 1832. At 
the dissolution, the Liberal party held 41 Scottish seats, and the 
i Ibid., 12 Apr., 2 June 1900. 
2 Dundee Advertiser, 8 June 1900. 
3 Glasgow Herald, 8 June 1900; Fry, Patronage and Principle, 117. 
4 North British Daily Mail, 8 June 1900. 
5 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10131 (letterbook), fo 236, Rosebery to T. Wemyss 
Reid, 1 Jul. 1900 ('Confidential'); Glasgow Herald, 13 June 1900. 
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Unionists and Liberal Unionists 31. After the election of 1900, the 
Liberals lost 7 Scottish seats and were outnumbered by the Unionists 
38 seats to 34. The greatest losses were suffered by the anti-war 
Liberals. Before the election, 16 Scottish MPs can be categorised as 
pro-Boer, on the basis of their parliamentary voting and public 
declarations.1 Of the 16, 2 withdrew as candidates before the election 
and 5 suffered defeat at the polls.2 The remaining 9 were re-elected 
(though 6 of them with diminished majorities) and one new pro 
Boer Liberal, J. D. Hope, was elected for the miners5 constituency of 
West Fife. This gave the Liberal pro-Boers only 10 Scottish seats. 
The Liberal Imperialist section, on the other hand, fared better. Of 
their 12 Scottish MPs at the dissolution, one, Gibson-Carmichael, 
MP for Midlothian, withdrew before the election because of ill 
health, but the other 11 were all re-elected.3 In addition, the Liberal 
Imperialist, R. L. Harmsworth, defeated the Liberal pro-Boer MP, 
G. B. Clark, in Caithness. Three or four new Liberal Imperialist 
candidates were defeated, and the Liberal Imperialists again held 12 
seats after the election. The over-all electoral swing against the 
Liberals in Scotland was less than 2% and the Liberals gained 50.2% 
of the popular vote. The swing against the Liberals, however, would 
have been more pronounced without the votes for the Liberal Imperi 
alist candidates.4 
The fact that in the United Kingdom as a whole the Unionists 
had gained only 4 seats in 1900 made their gain of 7 seats in Scotland, 
the former bastion of Liberalism, all the more dramatic. The result 
in the industrial west of Scotland were especially alarming for the 
Liberals. In Glasgow, the Liberals lost their last 2 seats, giving all 7 
seats to the Unionists, while of a total of 29 county and burgh 
i The 16 were: J. Bryce (Aberdeen South), T. R. Buchanan (East Aber 
deenshire), G. B. Clark (Caithness-shire), J. Dalziel (Kirkcaldy Burghs), A. Dewar 
(Edinburgh South), G. McCrae (Edinburgh East), W. McEwan (Edinburgh Cen 
tral), J. MacLeod (Sutherland-shire), J. Morley (Montrose Burghs), D. V. Pirie 
(Aberdeen North), R. Reid (Dumfries Burghs), T. Shaw (Hawick Burghs), J. 
Sinclair (Forfarshire), A. R. Suttar (Dumfries-shire), W. Wedderburn (Banffshire), 
J. G. Weir (Ross & Cromarty). See The Times, 31 Jul. 1900; J. Auld, 'The Liberal 
Pro-Boers', Journal of British Studies, xiv (1975), 100-1; Price, An Imperial War, 
250-1. 
2 Withdrew: McEwan, Wedderburn; defeated: Buchanan, Clark, Dewar, 
MacLeod, Suttar. 
3 The 12 Liberal Imperialists at the dissolution were: A. Asher (Elgin Burghs), 
H. H. Asquith (East Fifeshire), T. D. Gibson-Carmichael (Midlothian), J. W. 
Crombie (Kincardineshire), C. M. Douglas (North-West Lanarkshire), R. C. 
Munro-Ferguson (Leith), H. J. Tennant (Berwickshire), A. Ure (Linlithgowshire), 
R. Wallace (Perth), E. Wason (Clackmannan & Kinross), W. Dunn (Paisley), 
R. B. Haldane (Haddingtonshire). See The Times, 31 Jul. 1900, Mathew, Liberal 
Imperialists, 295-301. 
4 British Parliamentary Election Results, i88j-igi8, ed. F.W.S. Craig (London, 
1974), 576; T. Boyle, 'The Liberal Imperialists', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research, Iii (1979), 56. 
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constituencies in the west of Scotland, the Liberals won only 6.1 'For 
the first time', trumpeted the Unionist Scotsman on 17 October, 
'Scotland stands forth as a Kingdom in which Unionism is the 
dominant creed, and Radicalism has to take a back seat in that part 
of the realm which hitherto had been its most stubborn stronghold'.2 
For Rosebery's Scottish supporters, the moment had arrived for 
his return to the Liberal leadership. Scottish Liberal voters, it seemed, 
had expressed their weariness with outworn dogmas, and their sup 
port for the war and imperialism; they appeared ready for a new 
leader and a new beginning with a 'clean slate'. Campbell-Ban 
nerman had done all he could to get the party through the general 
election, but it was time now to free him from the burden of being a 
stop-gap leader. Rosebery, asserted the North British Daily Mail on 
18 October, personified the 'newer and broader spirit of Liberalism 
... the Liberalism of the future'.3 For some Liberal Imperialists, 
Scotland was the key to Liberal reform throughout the United King 
dom. 
'Liberalism', Alfred Harmsworth's Liberal Imperialist Daily 
News of Glasgow asserted on 14 October 1900, 'will never regain its 
old position in the United Kingdom unless and until it is able to 
establish something like the old sympathy with Scottish opinion'.4 
Now was the time for a second Midlothian, to arouse the faithful in 
Scotland with the moral obligations of Britain's world leadership, to 
awaken them to the vital need for 
'efficiency', and to bring Rosebery 
out of retirement and into the Liberal leadership. 
IV 
In explaining the Liberal defeat in Scotland to Campbell-Banner 
man, the Scottish Liberal whip, Munro-Ferguson, endeavoured to 
play down the party divisions. Some of the candidates, Munro 
Ferguson suggested, 'were very raw'. In the west of Scotland, the 
Scoto-Irish Catholic vote had gone Unionist because of their prom 
ises to establish a Catholic university for Ireland, while industrial 
employers, profiting from military contracts, had 'put on the screw 
everywhere' to pressure workers into voting Unionist. In the east, 
'the Tories somehow or other had a rally after the dissolution'.5 For 
Campbell-Bannerman, however, a major cause was party division. 
i 'The General Election', Edinburgh Review, cxcii (Oct. 1900), 539; H. Pelling, 
Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-igio (London, 1967), 400-10. 
2 Scotsman, 17 Oct. 1900. 
3 North British Daily Mail, 18 Oct. 1900. 
4 Daily News (Glasgow), 14 Oct. 1900. 
5 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41222, fos 330-3, Munro-Ferguson 
to Campbell-Bannerman, 24 Oct. 1900. 
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'The wretched result in Scotland', he confided to Herbert Gladstone, 
the Liberal chief whip, on 22 October, resulted largely from 'our 
own factions, which have taken some of the heart out of us'. 'We 
must now', he added, 'begin to set our house in order'.1 
One of Campbell-Bannerman's first acts after the election was 
to accept Munro-Ferguson's resignation as Scottish Liberal whip. 
Munro-Ferguson had been accused during the election of dis 
tributing party campaign funds 'solely to "Imperialists" 
' 
and 
although he denied the allegation, his loyalties to Rosebery did make 
it appear he was playing a double game.2 Lord Tweedmouth, the 
former Liberal chief whip, was convinced that Munro-Ferguson had 
not 'seen the elections through energetically and squarely', while 
shortly after his resignation, in a speech to his constituents at Leith 
on 18 November, Munro-Ferguson confessed to having long opposed 
Campbell-Bannerman's policies.3 Campbell-Bannerman replaced 
Munro-Ferguson (Rosebery's former private secretary) with his own 
former private secretary, Captain John Sinclair, MP for Forfarshire. 
Sinclair was a pro-Boer, a moderate social reformer, and an advocate 
of Irish home rule. He was especially 'well known and popular' in 
the west of Scotland, which had gone so solidly Unionist at the 
election.4 The major question was whether the genial Sinclair would 
be able to 'stiffen his back and insist on having his own way' against 
the Liberal Imperialists.5 
On 15 November, in a speech in Dundee, Campbell-Bannerman 
gave an example of 'stiffened back' as he responded to the calls for 
Rosebery's return. Following a spirited defence of the 'dogmas' of 
Liberalism?the 'Manchester principles' of peace, retrenchment and 
free trade?he turned to the Liberal Imperialists, whom, with per 
haps an intentional slip of the tongue, he called 'Liberal Unionists'. 
They would, he declared, have to decide whether they remained in 
communion with the four-fifths of the party who stayed loyal to the 
old Liberal faith, or whether they would secede. As to the rumours 
that Rosebery would soon come out of retirement, Campbell-Ban 
nerman expressed the hope that if Rosebery did return it would be 
to support the whole party and not 'to put himself at the head of 
a section'.6 The Dundee speech was an unexpected show of grit, 
i J. A. Spender, The Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923), i, 
297-8. 
2 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41222, fos 326-7, Munro-Ferguson 
to Campbell-Bannerman, 12 Sep. 1900. 
3 Ibid., Add. MS 41231, fos 67-70, Tweedmouth to Campbell-Bannerman, 7 
Nov,. 1900; Scotsman, 19 Nov. 1900. 
4 Lady Pentland, John Sinclair, Lord Pentland: A Memoir (London, 1928), 20-59; 
Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, i, 299-300. 
5 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41231, fos 67-70, Tweedmouth to 
Campbell-Bannerman, 7 Nov. 1900. 
6 Scotsman, 16 Nov. 1900; Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, i, 301-5. 
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demonstrating that Campbell-Bannerman had no intention of relin 
quishing the party leadership. Leading Liberal Imperialists protested 
that Campbell-Bannerman was forcing a split.1 
The following day, Rosebery delivered his rectorial address at 
Glasgow University, using the opportunity to present a glittering 
exposition of the imperialist mission and the creed of 'national effi 
ciency'. The empire, he maintained, 'is to us a matter of influence, 
of peace, of civilisation, above all, a question of faith'. Although the 
British were by nature 'a conquering and imperial race', there was 
no room for complacency concerning the preservation of the empire 
and Britain's great power status. Britain now faced imperial com 
petitors, and would need to modernize and to mobilise all its human 
resources. Individual self-interest should be subordinated to the pres 
ervation and expansion the empire. In education, there must be 
more attention to science, technical training, business studies and 
modern languages. There must be social reform, because 'in the 
rookeries and slums' of Britain's cities 'an imperial race cannot be 
reared'. Government must be made more efficient and 'business 
like'. Such reforms would have practical benefits for the nation. But 
in the final analysis, the empire was not to be maintained for selfish 
purposes. The British were a covenanted people, under 'the supreme 
direction of the Almighty', and in the empire, even 'the most cynical 
must see the finger of the Divine'.2 Rosebery's address aroused con 
siderable popular enthusiasm, especially in imperialist and com 
mercial Glasgow.3 'He has a great gift of speech', A. L. Brown 
informed Campbell-Bannerman on 21 November, 'he can "cast his 
glamour" over men. I was in Glasgow yesterday where people are 
under the influence of his Rectorial address and the so-called Liberal 
friends I met were all roaring for Rosebery to put himself at our 
head'.4 Outside Glasgow, however, Liberal opinion was less enthusi 
astic. The Liberal Dundee Advertiser criticised the lack of humanitarian 
and cosmopolitan spirit in Rosebery's address, with its suggestions 
that other nations 'somehow enjoy less of the guidance of the Divine 
finger'. The Edinburgh Evening News condemned Rosebery's 'jingoism' 
and shallow view of world history. On Sunday, 25 November, two 
Dundee clergymen preached sermons in critical response to Rose 
i NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 100057, f?s 99_I?2, T. Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 
17 Nov. 1900; BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41218, fos 20-3, E. Grey 
to Campbell-Bannerman, 17 Nov. 1900; Scotsman, 16, 17 Nov. 1900; Spender, 
Campbell-Bannerman, i, 305-8. 
2 
'Questions of Empire', in Lord Rosebery, Miscellanies: Literary and Historical, 
ed. J. Buchan, Lord Tweedsmuir (London, 1921), ii, 229-63. 
3 Rhodes James, Rosebery, 419-20; Scotsman, 17, 20, 23, 24 Nov. 1900; Fry, 
Patronage and Principle, 120. 
4 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41236, fos 29-35, A. L. Brown to 
Campbell-Bannerman, 21 Nov. 1900. 
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bery's 'gospel of imperialism'.1 There was, in short, no united call 
for Rosebery's return from Liberals in Scotland. 
In part this was because of growing public unease in Scotland with 
the new direction taken by the war in South Africa. For the war had 
not ended with the imperial victories in the early summer of 1900 as 
expected. Despite the occupation of their capitals, the Boers had 
continued to resist, living off the land and employing guerilla tactics 
against the superior numbers of imperial troops. In August 1900, the 
British command began a policy of burning Boer farms and placing 
Boer women and children in hastily constructed camps, where over 
crowding and insanitary conditions would eventually result in the 
deaths of an estimated 4,000 women and 16,000 children.2 The 
Scottish public, A. L. Brown informed Campbell-Bannerman in 
November 1900, was becoming deeply distressed by the way the 
war was being conducted?through 'devastation, burning houses, 
turning women and children adrift'. Gladstone, Brown averred, 
would have come down on such tactics 'like a cart of bricks'.3 
On 14 June 1901, Campbell-Bannerman gave vent to the growing 
unease with the war in a speech before the National Reform Union 
in London. Morally indignant over a recent report on the high 
death rates and atrocious conditions in the camps?in February and 
March, a quarter of all children in the camps had died?Campbell 
Bannerman denounced the government for employing 'methods of 
barbarism' in its conduct of the war in South Africa. Many were 
enraged by his remarks, which called into question the humanity of 
the imperial troops fighting in South Africa and seemed to encourage 
the Boer commandos. But Campbell-Bannerman was sincere in his 
moral outrage, and refused to retract his words. A few days later, on 
17 June, he repeated the 'methods of barbarism' phrase in the house 
of commons, while supporting Lloyd George's motion to adjourn 
regular business and consider conditions in the camps. In the division 
that followed, the Liberal Imperialist MPs refused to vote with the 
party leader. Indeed, only 78 of the 186 Liberals in the house? 
including only 17 of the 34 Liberal MPs for Scotland?supported 
Campbell-Bannerman.4 Haldane believed that the Liberal rank and 
file were at last convinced 'that Sir H. CB's leading is hopeless'.5 
Rosebery called for new direction for the divided party, but declined 
to come forward himself to claim the leadership. Asquith therefore 
i Dundee Advertiser, 17 Nov. 1900; Edinburgh Evening News, 17, 26 Nov. 1900. 
2 Wilson, CB, 344. 
3 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41236, fos 29-35, A. L. Brown to 
Campbell-Cannerman, 21 Nov. 1900. 
4 Scotsman, 19 June 1901. 
5 NLS, Haldane MSS, MS 5963, fos 225-6, R. B. Haldane to his mother, 22 
June 1901. 
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assumed the leadership of the Liberal Imperialist section, which 
openly challenged Campbell-Bannerman and planned to appeal to 
Liberal opinion with a series of meetings to be held in Scotland 
during the autumn of 1901. 
In Scotland, however, Liberal opinion was far from convinced that 
Campbell-Bannerman had been wrong to condemn the conditions in 
the camps. There was unease with a war being directed against 
women and children, and which increasingly seemed to have for its 
object the crushing of the Boer people.1 The Dundee Advertiser also 
condemned Rosebery's public criticism of the party leader, when he 
himself declined to enter the political fray: 'the voice from a lonely 
height is apt to become thinner in its volume, as well as falser in its 
accent'.2 For the pro-Boer Edinburgh Evening News, it was the Liberal 
Imperialists who had separated themselves from Liberal opinion by 
their unreserved support for the government. 'They could not', it 
observed of the Liberal Imperialists, 'help supporting annexation, 
they could not help supporting farm-burning, they cannot help sup 
porting the horrors of the concentration camps. What claim have 
they, then, to remain with the Opposition, or to call themselves 
Liberal?'3 
In the by-election in North-East Lanark, Campbell-Bannerman 
demonstrated that he would fight the Liberal Imperialists. In August 
1901, the death of the Liberal MP, John Colville, forced a by-election 
in the industrial constituency of North-East Lanark, a solid Liberal 
seat since its creation in 1884. The Liberal constituency association 
selected as their candidate the wealthy Liberal Imperialist, Cecil 
Harmsworth, brother of the prominent newspaper proprietor, Alfred 
Harmsworth. Campbell-Bannerman, however, claimed that the Lib 
eral Imperialists had used unfair influence with the local association 
and he refused to endorse Harmsworth's candidature.4 Instead, he 
made it clear that he preferred the Labour candidate, Robert Smillie, 
president of the Scottish Miners' Federation. A pro-Boer and a home 
ruler, Smillie also professed himself to be 'an earnest advocate of all 
the reforms which at one time formed the various planks of the 
Liberal platform'.5 The Scottish whip, John Sinclair, along with the 
Scottish Liberal MPs, D. V. Pirie and J. D. Hope, travelled to North 
East Lanark to campaign for the Labour candidate. The result on 
26 September was a split Liberal vote and the election of the Unionist 
i Dundee Advertiser, 15, 18, 19 June 1901; Edinburgh Evening News, 15, 18 June 
1901. 
2 Dundee Advertiser, 18 Jul. 1901. 
3 Edinburgh Evening News, 18 June 1901. 
4 BL, Viscount Gladstone MSS, Add. MS 45995, fos 16-7, J. Sinclair to H. 
Gladstone, 28 Aug. [1901]; Scotsman, 5, 6 Sep. 1901. 
5 Scotsman, 4 Sep. 1901; W. H. Fraser, 'The Labour Party in Scotland', in The 
First Labour Party, igo6-igi4, ed. K. D. Brown (London, 1985), 42-3. 
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candidate.1 The Liberal Imperialists protested against the conduct 
of 'certain Liberal MPs' in the North-East Lanark contest to the 
executive council of the Scottish Liberal Association?but they no 
longer controlled the executive and no action was taken.2 
In late September, the Liberal Imperialists began their autumn 
campaign, with Asquith, Haldane, Grey and Munro-Ferguson 
addressing meetings in different parts of Scotland, calling for the 
abandonment of Irish home rule and reaffirming their commitment 
to imperialism and national efficiency.3 'It is mutiny and enmity 
now', Campbell-Bannerman observed to Sinclair on 21 September, 
'just as much as before'.4 The Asquith campaign, however, failed to 
arouse much enthusiasm and drew to a quiet close in late October. 
On 25 October, Campbell-Bannerman addressed the autumn con 
ference of the Scottish Liberal Association in Stirling, reaffirming 
that he would neither resign as leader nor cease to condemn 'methods 
of barbarism' in South Africa. The conference responded to his 
pluck by reaffirming its 'strenuous and unreserved support' for his 
leadership, and unanimously adopting an executive-sponsored res 
olution deploring the government's South African policy for threat 
ening 'to involve the Country and Empire in humiliation and dis 
aster'.5 
The public mood in Scotland was changing. As the war dragged 
on, with its drain on lives and money, Liberal Imperialist speeches 
on the mission of empire grew less alluring. Behind the sermons on 
Britain's imperial destiny, there seemed to lurk something dark and 
disturbing. On 30 October, an anti-war meeting was held in Edin 
burgh's Music Hall, with Lloyd George as principal speaker. The hall 
was filled to overflowing and there were no disturbances. 'Scotsmen', 
commented the Edinburgh Evening News the next day, 'are recovering 
from their temporary hallucination, and are once more ready to 
respond to the old, well-tried watchwords of freedom and justice'.6 
Campbell-Bannerman was now receiving additional support from a 
group of zealous young Liberal pro-Boers who a year before had 
formed the Young Scots Society. With the motto, 'For Scotland and 
Gladstone', the Young Scots campaigned for an end to the war and 
the rejection of imperialism. Young Scots had organised a massive 
anti-war meeting in Edinburgh's Waverley Market in April 1901, 
which had attracted an estimated 10,000. They were present in force 
i Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 74-5; R. Smillie, My Life for Labour (London, 
1924), 107-12; Scotsman, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28 Sep. 1901; D. Howell, British Workers 
and the Independent Labour Party (Manchester, 1983), 163-6. 
2 EUL, SLA Mins., Executive Council, 16 Oct. 1901. 
3 Scotsman, 30 Sep., 4, 5, 22, 23, 25 Oct. 1901. 
4 Pentland, Lord Pentland, 62; Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, ii, 5-6. 
5 EUL, SLA Mins., 25 Oct. 1901; Scotsman, 26 Oct. 1901. 
6 Edinburgh Evening News, 1 Nov. 1901. 
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to heckle the Asquith committee meetings in September and October 
and they offered their services to the Scottish Liberal Association to 
organise anti-war meetings.1 T am glad to report to you well of the 
general feeling in Scotland', Campbell-Bannerman wrote to Lord 
Ripon early in November: 
It is a great change since last year, and last week nothing could have 
exceeded the friendly enthusiasm with which I was received, or the 
sympathy expressed even for extreme views of the war. The revolt of 
our "Lib. Imps."?the Chartered Company as I call them has failed: 
the Asquith demonstration squib fizzed off the wrong way, and, for 
the present, things go well.2 
Two years before, Rosebery had prophesied that the war and its 
imperialist enthusiasms would serve to purge the Liberal party of 
its 'ranker elements' and reconstruct it around the principles of 
imperialism and national efficiency. But now, with the failure of their 
autumn campaign to overthrow Campbell-Bannerman, it was the 
Liberal Imperialists who were in danger of being driven from the 
party. As Haldane observed to Rosebery on 6 November, 'we have 
burned our boats'.3 Throughout October, Rosebery had remained 
in seclusion on his Dalmeny estate outside Edinburgh, plagued by 
indecision and insomnia as the Liberal Imperialist 'revolt' in Scot 
land collapsed. Would it be honourable for him to stand by and 
watch as his supporters were driven into the wilderness? 
V 
Rosebery came to the defence of his followers on 16 December with 
a 
well-publicised address at Chesterfield, in which he described a 
way forward to Liberal reunion and recovery. He summoned the 
Liberal party to discard 'the fly-blown phylacteries of obsolete polic 
ies', including Irish home rule and Gladstonian reserve toward the 
empire, and to begin again with a 'clean slate' from which they 
might develop policies for the increased efficiency of the state. He 
also called for immediate negotiations to end the war in South Africa. 
There should be, he maintained, the offer of a generous amnesty for 
Boer commandos still in the field and government grants for restoring 
destroyed farms and livestock.4 Following the Chesterfield address, 
Rosebery and Campbell-Bannerman met together privately in Lon 
i Scotsman, 27 Apr. 1901; Lord Graigmyle, Letters to Isabel (London, 1936), 205 
10; EUL, SLA Mins., Organising Committee, Edinburgh, 7 Nov. 1901. 
2 Cited in L. Wolf, Life of the First Marquess of Ripon (London, 1921), ii, 265-6. 
3 Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 75-8. 
4 Scotsman, 17 Dec. 1910. 
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don in an attempt to heal the rift in the Liberal party. The discussion 
broke down, however?in part over the fate of Rosebery's Liberal 
Imperialist followers. 'He spoke', Rosebery noted the next day in a 
personal memorandum, 
c 
... with great bitterness (quite unlike him) 
of the "rebellion" attempted in Scotland which had been "put down 
and squashed out by our fellows". He named Haldane and Munro 
Ferguson with peculiar asperity'.1 Relations between the two men 
deteriorated still further when a report of their private interview 
appeared in the Liberal Dundee Advertiser?the result, Rosebery 
believed, of a deliberate leak by Campbell-Bannerman. On 25 
December, Sinclair reported from Scotland that the Liberal Imperi 
alists continued to hold 'aloof from the general party meetings and 
functions' and to associate exclusively among themselves.2 
Haldane was in fact now engaged in organisational work in Scot 
land. Following discussions with Rosebery at Dalmeny, Haldane 
travelled to Glasgow, where he took soundings on the depth of 
imperialist and anti-Irish feeling. Early in January, he reported to 
Rosebery that there was enthusiasm in Glasgow for the idea of a new 
Liberal Imperialist organisation, and by 9 January, he had formed 
an organising committee for a proposed 'Scottish National Liberal 
Association'.3 Not connected with the largely discredited Liberal 
Imperialist League founded in England in April 1900, this new 
organisation emphasized the principles of national efficiency as out 
lined in Rosebery's Chesterfield address.4 Encouraged by Haldane's 
success in Glasgow, Rosebery gave the go ahead for a new national 
association, the Liberal League, which was inaugurated in London 
on 26 February 1902. The Glasgow organisation immediately affili 
ated, taking the new title of 'The Glasgow and West of Scotland 
Liberal League'. Addressing the Glasgow branch on 10 March, 
Rosebery stated that the league's aim was not to split the Liberal 
party, but rather to enable Liberal Imperialists to work for reform 
from within the party without fear of the official leadership.5 
The Liberal League devpted its organisational efforts largely to 
Scotland, which was still regarded as Rosebery's political base and 
where they hoped to appeal to Liberal businessmen, landowners and 
professionals with the message of'efficiency'. Despite the early hopes, 
however, it proved difficult to sustain public interest in the league. 
i Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery (London, 1931), ii, 573-4. 
2 BL, Viscount Gladstone MSS, Add. MS 45986, fos 47-8, Rosebery to H. 
Gladstone, 10 Jan. 1902; Add. MS 45995, fos 34-9, J. Sinclair to Gladstone, 25 Dec. 
1901. 
3 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10030, fos 1-5, R. B. Haldane to Rosebery, 3, 9 
Jan. 1902. 
4 Mathew, Liberal Imperialists, 62. 
5 Ibid., 86-90; Hamer, Liberal Politics, 276-8; C. Douglas, 'The Liberal League', 
Contemporary Review, lxxxi (Apr. 1902), 573-88. 
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Organisational efforts were hampered by suspicions that Rosebery 
would lose interest and return to retirement. 'The two or three men 
to whom I spoke in Edinburgh', Munro-Ferguson informed Rosebery 
on 19 June, 'all said much the same thing?"Are we going to be left 
in the lurch?" '* Further, in May 1902 the war in South Africa finally 
came to an end. With the war over, many wished to put its divisions 
behind them. 'The danger now', the wealthy Glasgow shipowner 
and league member, Joseph Maclay, informed Rosebery on 19 June, 
'is apathy... . Many think [the league] has served the purpose of its 
existence and unity should now be the aim'. In Edinburgh, Gibson 
Carmichael found little eagerness for proposals to open a second 
Scottish league branch there. 'Now that the war is over', he wrote 
to Rosebery on 3 July, 'to start new branches of it will only be 
interpreted as acting factiously and that will not be at all popular in 
Scotland'. At Rosebery's insistence, a league branch was established 
in Edinburgh in late July 1902. Throughout the summer and 
autumn, Rosebery and other league leaders concentrated their speak 
ing and organisational efforts on Scotland.2 Campbell-Bannerman, 
however, was no longer worried. Given that 'the League leaders are 
all there', he reassured Sinclair on 9 October, it was not surprising 
that they were again 'doing much devilment' north of the Tweed. 
But he was confident the league would fail.3 By late 1902, the league 
was indeed stagnating in Scotland and its financial contributions 
were drying up. 'Scotland does not give us a shilling', Rosebery 
complained to Haldane on 5 September 1902, 'indeed it extracts 
what it can from our meagre funds'.4 
The failure of the Liberal League reflected declining Scottish 
confidence in the Roseberyites and their imperial vision. There was 
growing concern over the costs of the war, while peace brought a 
drying up of lucrative war-time contracts. The Liberal party in 
Scotland was rallying under the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman, 
but it was rallying to the old orthodoxy of peace, retrenchment and 
democratic reform, and not to efficiency and imperialism. While the 
league was stagnating by the autumn of 1902, it was the issue of 
tariff reform that finally finished the league as a political force and 
provided the opportunity for Liberal reunion and revival. After May 
1903, when the Unionist colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, 
revived the issue of protective tariffs and imperial preference, Scottish 
i NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10019, fos 146-7, R. Munro-Ferguson to Rosebery, 
19 June 1902. 
2 Ibid, MS 10168, fos 154-5, J. Maclay to Rosebery, 19 June 1902, fos 178-83, 
T. D. Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery, 3 Jul. 1902; Hutchison, Political History of 
Scotland, 228-9. 
3 BL, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add. MS 41230, fos 58-9, Campbell-Ban 
nerman to Sinclair, 9 Oct. 1902. 
4 Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 228. 
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Liberal opinion rallied in defence of free trade. Even in Unionist 
Glasgow, the shipbuilding, coal and steel interests rejected protection 
as a threat to their economic interests. Privately Rosebery, Haldane 
and other league leaders were prepared to consider proposals for 
imperial preference. However, in view of the popular wave against 
protection and their own distrust of Chamberlain, the league decided 
to support fully the movement for free trade. In Scotland, the league 
joined with the Scottish Liberal Association and Young Scots Society 
to form the Scottish Free Trade Union. By 1904, the league was 
cooperating in electoral organisation with the Scottish Liberal 
Association, and league leaders, including Munro-Ferguson and 
Thomas Glen-Coats, rejoined the Scottish Liberal Association execu 
tive. 
The Scottish Liberal party entered the election of January 1906 
with unity among its three main Liberal organisations?the Scottish 
Liberal Association in the centre, the Liberal League on the right 
and the Young Scots Society on the left.1 At the election, the Liberals 
won 58 of Scotland's 72 seats?the largest Liberal victory in Scotland 
since 1885. The triumph was repeated four years later. In the election 
of January 1910, when the Liberal party lost over 100 seats in 
England, the Liberals in Scotland actually added another seat, giving 
them now 59 seats to Labour's 2 and the Unionists' 11. 'The election', 
observed Blackwood's Magazine in March 191 o, 'being largely fought 
on old issues, resurrected much of the old Liberalism of the 
'eighties... . the spirit of Mr. Gladstone still walks on Scottish soil, 
and the echoes of Midlothian have not died away'.2 The election in 
December 1910 brought virtually no change. Never before had the 
Liberals done so well in Scotland while doing so poorly in England.3 
Rosebery's political career was now largely over. The Liberal 
League in Scotland dissolved in 1906 (a few years before it broke up 
in England), and most of Rosebery's followers made their peace with 
Campbell-Bannerman and entered the Liberal government in 1905. 
But for Rosebery there had been no second Midlothian?no clear 
call from the Scottish people, no triumphant return as leader to 
purge the party of the 'ranker elements' and reconstruct it on Liberal 
Imperialist principles. At the beginning of the South African war, 
the Roseberyites' campaign to win Scotland over to Liberal Imperi 
alism had had a reasonable prospect of success. Rosebery was 
extremely popular in Scotland, while most Scottish Liberals probably 
supported the war for imperial interests in South Africa. But after 
i EUL, SLA Mins., Organising Committee, 5 Nov., 21 Dec. 1905, 7 Feb. 1906. 
2 'The Elections and their Moral', Blackwood's Magazine, clxxxvii (Mar. 1910), 
455 
3 N. Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People: The British General Elections of 
igw (London, 1972), 381-5, 400-2. 
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the autumn of 1900, with the spiralling cost of the war and the 
moral unease over farm-burning and the camps, Scottish Liberals? 
including apparently the business, landowning and professional 
groups to whom Liberal Imperialists had directed their main 
appeal?began to realise that there was a limit to the price they were 
willing to pay for empire. Had the British forces achieved an early 
victory in the South African war at a modest cost, Rosebery's support 
for the war might have brought Liberal Imperialism the popular 
impetus that it needed. But the expense and moral ambiguities of 
the latter stages of war served to discredit Rosebery's imperial vision. 
Writing in mid-1903, Hector Macpherson, editor of the Edinburgh 
Evening News, argued that Rosebery's attempt at the beginning of 
the war to convert Scottish Liberalism to imperialism had been 
understandable. 'What was not intelligible', Macpherson continued, 
'was his belief that after the full effect of the war had become manifest 
Scottish Liberals would endorse a policy which involved increased 
national expenditure'.1 At the beginning of the war, John Morley 
had argued that Britain could not afford both an expansionist 
imperial policy and needed social reforms at home. The South 
African war had demonstrated the immense financial costs of modern 
warfare, while it was not clear that controlling and developing the 
South African region would bring appreciable benefits to the Scottish 
economy. 
If anyone had revived the echoes of Midlothian, it had been 
Campbell-Bannerman?reviving with his condemnations of the 
'methods of barbarism' some of Gladstone's prophetic rage against 
the arrogance of power that had thrilled Scotland in the later 1870s. 
The Liberal Imperialist vision had called for the subordination of 
Scottish national identity to the mission of the British imperial state, 
and the subordination of popular government to the guidance of a 
wealthy educated elite. During the South African war, rank and file 
Scottish Liberals largely rejected this idea of subordination and 
revived a Scottish radical identity. The benefits of empire no longer 
seemed worth the sacrifice, and the elite no longer commanded 
such confidence. After 1902, the Young Scots Society revived the 
campaign for Scottish home rule, and the Liberal party in Scotland 
renewed its commitment to home-rule-all-round.2 The economic 
crisis of 1908 strengthened the influence of English social reformers 
in the Liberal party in Scotland, while the Liberal victories in 1910, 
as I. G. C. Hutchison has noted, 'positively opened the floodgates to 
i H. Macpherson, 'Scottish Liberalism: Past and Present', The Speaker, n.s., viii 
(6 June 1903), 230. 
2 Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 241; J. Brand, The National Movement in 
Scotland (London, 1978), 40-1. 
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social radicals'.1 The Liberal party in Scotland directed its attention 
to reform at home?not in order to succour an imperial race (as the 
Liberal Imperialists would have had it) but to improve conditions 
for the Scottish people and give greater voice to popular aspirations 
on the 'Celtic fringe' of the British Isles. 
i Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 239-40. 
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